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The Utilities Directive-A Giant Step Down 
the Long and Winding Road Toward 
Opening Public Procurement 
Markets in the EC 
INTRODUCTION 
Public procurement pertains to contracts involving "a manufac-
turer or supplier of goods or machinery or services under the terms 
of which a sale or service is made to the government."1 These 
government contracts involve a specific bidding, or "tendering" pro-
cedure which also is governed by standardized government regula-
tions.2 Public procurement always has been a common governmen-
tal practice. Today, liberalization of the public procurement market 
is an important link to achieving the ultimate goal of a unified 
European market.3 Despite the importance of public procurement, 
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC 
Treaty)4 does not discuss public procurement specifically.5 Article 3 
of the EEC Treaty, however, explains that the overall objective is to 
create a free market in goods and services within European Com-
munity (EC) borders.6 Other articles in the EEC Treaty establish 
guidelines for EC competition in the public procurement realm.7 
The public procurement market is significant and opening it up is 
crucial for the achievement of a complete integration of a single 
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1208 (6th ed. 1990). 
2 [d. 
3 Julia A. Sohrab, The Single European Market and Public Procurement, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 522, 522 (1990). 
4The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) came into 
force January I, 1958. See generally TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMU-
NITY, [EEC TREATY J. The original signatories to the Treaty are Belgium, Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. See id. 
S Sohrab, supra note 3, at 522. 
6 [d.; EEC TREATY, art. 3. 
7 G. Brian Raley, Comment, European Cammunity: European Commission and Denmark Reach 
Settlement of Dispute Over Construction Contract Granted Uy Denmark to Six-Party Consortium in 
Violation of the Public Procurement Provision in the Treaty of Rame, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 
665, 667 (1989). 
III 
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European market.8 The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
estimates that public procurement contributes to 15 percent of the 
EC's gross domestic product.9 Moreover, roughly 7 percent of this 
amount stems from the telecommunications, water, energy, and 
transport sectors.lO Public purchasing throughout the Community is 
estimated to amount to ECU 550 billion.l1 
Discriminatory practices of each individual nation, favoring do-
mestic producers, appear to benefit national economies, particularly 
in the short run. In the long run, however, nationalistic pursuits 
result in poorer quality goods, trade distortions, and increased 
prices.12 Nonetheless, the Commission argues that over 75 percent 
of procurement authorities openly use discriminatory practices, giv-
ing preference to "national champions."13 The result is that discrimi-
natory practices ignore quality and cost-effectiveness.14 
This Comment considers the Council of Minister's decision to 
open up the public procurement markets in the four utility sectors 
historically excluded from public procurement Directives. Part I 
provides the relevant background of the public procurement Direc-
tives, their amendments and their shortcomings. Part II introduces 
the new Utilities Directive aimed at opening up public procurement 
in energy, transport, water, and telecommunications. Specifically, 
Part II examines the different requirements of the Directive and the 
various problems the EC has faced thus far in achieving unified 
compliance by all Member States. Part III examines the Remedies 
Directive subsequently passed with the intention of enhancing the 
enforcement of the Utilities Directive. Part IV analyzes the antici-
pated effects and likelihood of enforcement of the Utilities and 
Remedies Directives. This Comment concludes that the EC faces a 
8 Sohrab, supra note 3, at 522-23. Governments are influential and important clients of 
industry. Friedl Weiss, Public Procurement Law in the EC Internal Market 1992: The Second 
Coming of the European Champion, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 307, 311 (1992). For example, in the 
United Kingdom, the Ministry of Defense purchases approximately 40,000 procurement 
contracts a year, creating at least 350,000 jobs. Id. at 311 n.14. Governments are also influential 
because governmental financial control enables a government to close certain markets to 
outside competition. Id. at 31l. 
9 Sohrab, supra note 3, at 523. 
10 Id. 
II Id. "The ECU is a monetary unit based on a collection of Communi ty national currencies 
and it is used for Community financial transactions." Raley, supra note 7, at 668. 
12 Sohrab, supra note 3, at 523. 
13Weiss, supra note 8, at 312. 
14Id.; Sohrab, supra note 3, at 523. 
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long and difficult road to unification and solidarity in this area, and 
its biggest obstacle is each Member State's own national interests. 
I. HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES 
In 1971, the EC passed the first in a series of Directives designed 
to open procurement markets. On July 26, 1971, the Council 
adopted Directive 71/30515 concerning the coordination of proce-
dures for the award of public works contracts (Works Directive). 
Additionally, on December 21, 1976, the EC enacted a similar in-
strument on government supplies contracts, Directive 77/62 (Sup-
plies Directive) .16 These Directives sought to eliminate trade distor-
tions caused by inefficiencies in awarding bids only to national 
favorites. Thus, the primary aim was to improve market information 
in order to assure that contracts would be awarded to suppliers and 
contractors most beneficial to the market and to the parties in-
volvedP 
The Directives do not establish a uniform set of rules for tender-
ing procedures to be adopted by each Member State .18 Rather, Mem-
ber States are free to exercise their tendering procedures at will as 
long as the standards used comply with relevant EC law.19 A report 
presented to the Council on the operation and application of these 
Directives determined that many countries failed to implement the 
Directives into national law properly.20 Further, those countries 
which did convert the Directives into national law failed to ensure 
compliance.21 As a result, these Directives had little impact on the 
public procurement market.22 
Aside from poor implementation and enforcement, the Works 
and the Supplies Directives had other flaws which a second wave of 
legislation tried to correct.23 Council Directive 88/295 amended the 
15 Council Directive 71/305, 1971 ].0. (L 185) l. 
16Council Directive 77/62, 1977 OJ. (L 13) l. 
17Jan A. Winler, Public Procurement in the EEC, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 741, 746 (1991). 
IBId. 
191d. 
20ld. at 747. 
211d. 
22Winler, supra nole 17, at 747. 
231d. at 748. In 1984, the Commission reported to the Council of Minislers that the Member 
States had failed to implement the Supplies and Works Directives accuralely and effectively, 
thus diminishing their pOlential impact The Commission ilemized what it thought hindered 
the Directives' influence and effect. First, the Directives covered a limited field because the 
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Supplies Directive on March 22, 1988.24 Similarly, Council Directive 
89/440 amended the Works Directive on July 18, 1989.25 These 
Directives improved the tendering rules by making them more 
definitive as well as more difficult to ignore.26 In addition, in order 
to ensure greater compliance with these Directives, the Council 
adopted Directive 89/665 on December 21, 1989.27 The Council 
adopted this Directive in an effort to establish adequate mechanisms 
that provide individual firms in all Member States with legal reme-
dies when needed,28 thus establishing a uniform procedure for each 
Member State to observe when reviewing the tendering process 
exercised by contracting authorities.29 
Misapplication of these Directives continues, however, and as a 
result, markets have remained essentially national preserves.30 At 
least 75 percent of all national tenders continue to go to national 
firms.3! According to one estimate, the inefficient effect of closed 
public procurement markets is costing the EC approximately ECU 
twenty billion per year. 32 
II. THE EXCLUDED SECTORS 
The Supplies and Works Directives exclude from their scope pro-
curement contracts awarded by the government authorities offering 
transport services or telecommunication services.33 The Directives 
also do not include services involving the production, distribution, 
transmission, or transportation of drinking water and energy.34 
four most important sectors had to be excluded. Secondly, the Commission discovered that 
in order to avoid the Directives, contracting entities would not award contracts above the 
necessary thresholds. Thirdly, decentralization of authority resulted in a low level of procure-
ment activity. Finally, authorities split contracts, underestimated contract values, and inten-
tionally divided projects to ensure the contracts fell below threshold values covered by the 
Directive. Weiss, supra note 8, at 315. 
24 Council Directive 88/295, 1988 OJ. (L 127) l. 
25 Council Directive 89/440, 1989 OJ. (L 210) l. 
26 See id.; Council Directive 88/295, supra note 24, at 1; Winter, supra note 17, at 748-49. 
27 Council Directive 89/665, 1989 OJ. (L 395) 33. 
28 See id. 
29Id. 
30 Commission Plans to Open Up Public Contract Bidding to Companies Throughout Commu-
nity, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Mar. 25, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ECLaw File. 
31Id. 
32Weiss, supra note 8, at 312. 
33Winter, supra note 17, at 763; Council Directive 90/531, 1990 OJ. (L 297) 1; see Council 
Directive 77/62, supra note 16, at 1; Council Directive 71/305, supra note 15, at l. 
34Winter, supra note 17, at 763; see Council Directive 71/305, supra note 15, at 1; Council 
Directive 77/62, supra note 16, at l. 
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These four sectors are treated separately because the Member States 
could not agree on common rules of coverage for these industries.35 
More specifically, the energy, water, transport, and telecommunica-
tions sectors were excluded primarily because the entities offering 
these services are governed by public law in some cases but by 
private law in other cases.36 In 1988, the Commission proposed to 
look beyond the public/private distinction because of the need to 
achieve a true liberalization of the market and a fair balance in the 
application of the procurement procedures.37 
A. The New Utilities Directive 
On September 17, 1990, the EC Council of Ministers adopted 
Directive 90/531 (Utilities Directive) on the procurement proce-
dures of entities operating in water, transport, energy, and telecom-
munication sectors.38 This Utilities Directive was the result oflengthy 
negotiations amongst Member States regarding the fair treatment 
of such services.39 Like the Supplies and Works Directives, the Utili-
ties Directive aims to eliminate nationalistic buying by utility com-
panies.40 A second objective of the Directive is to make tendering 
procedures more publicY The Utilities Directive does not overturn 
or reduce the scope of the Works or Supplies Directives.42 
The Utilities Directive became effective January 1, 1993, for most 
Member States. 43 Implementation of Directives, however, is often 
slow and varied.44 For example, although January 1, 1993, is the 
implementation date set for most Member States, only four Member 
35Winter, supra note 17, at 763; EC Council of Ministers Reaches Accord on Procurement in 
Excluded Sectors, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Feb. 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, 
ECLaw File [hereinafter EC Council of Ministers]. 
36Winter, supra note 17, at 763; Weiss, supra note 8, at 324. 
37Council Directive 90/531, supra note 33, at 2. 
381d. 
39Winter, supra note 17, at 763. 
40 Council Directive 90/531 supra note 33, at 2. 
41 See id. at 3. 
421d. 
43 EC Council of Ministers, supra note 35; Council Directive 90/531, supra note 33, at 1. The 
Council of Ministers determined that liberalization of public procurement contracts in the 
utilities sectors on January 1, 1993 might have an adverse affect upon the economies of Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece. Richard J. Astor, The Utilities Directive: Introduction and Selective Sum-
mary, INT'L Bus. L. 18,20 (1991). Therefore, for Spain the Directive will enter into force on 
January 1, 1996. ld. Similarly, the Directive will become effective for Greece and Portugal on 
January 1, 1998. ld. 
44 EC Council of Ministers, supra note 35. 
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States actually executed the Directive into national law by May of 
that year.45 While Belgium, Denmark, France, and the United King-
dom complied with the January 1, 1993, deadline, Germany, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Ireland, and Luxembourg have not respected the 
terms of the Directive.46 
The Utilities Directive applies to those buyers who: provide fixed 
"networks" offering specified services to the public in connection 
with drinking water, electricity, gas, or heat; who exploit geographi-
cal areas for specified purposes; who operate transport networks 
servicing the Member States; and who provide public telecommuni-
cation networks or servicesY In addition, the Directive creates ex-
emptions for listed buyers in particular circumstances because of the 
activities performed. For example, the Directive does not cover: (1) 
contracts awarded for purposes other than the pursuit of article 2 (2) 
activities;48 (2) contracts awarded for purposes of performing article 
2(2) activities outside the EC even though procurement is sourced 
within the EC;49 (3) procurements made by buyers exploiting geo-
graphical areas for the purpose of exploring or extracting natural 
resources defined under article 2(2) (b) if the buyer's Member State 
has obtained a Commission exemption under article 3;50 (4) pro-
curement of services which are covered by the Works and Supplies 
Directives;51 (5) contracts awarded for purpose of resale or hire to 
third parties;52 (6) procurement contracts deemed secret by the 
Member States;53 and (7) procurement contracts governed by the 
procedures of an international body. 54 
Furthermore, the Directive only applies to those contracts that 
meet the respective ceiling or threshold values imposed by the terms 
of the Utilities Directive. For example, in the case of public supplies 
45 European Community, EC Cammission Sends Procurement Pact to Council of Ministers for 
Appraval, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), May 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, 
Currn t File. 
46Id. 
47 Council Directive 90/531, supra note 33, arts. 2(2) (a)-(d). 
48Id. art. 6(1). 
49Id. 
50Id. art. 3. Article 3(1) states in pertinent part "Member States may request the Commis-
sion to provide that exploitation of geographical areas for the purpose of exploring for, or 
extracting, oil, gas, coal or other solid fuels shall not be considered to be an activity defined 
in Article 2 (2) (b) (i)." Id. 
5! Council Directive 90/531, supra note 33, art. 1 (3) (a). Procurement of software services 
by telecommunication entities is covered by the Utilities Directive, however. Id. art. 2(2)(d). 
52Id. art. 7(1). 
53Id. art. 10. 
54Id. art. 11 (3). 
1994] UTILITIES DIRECTIVE 117 
contracts awarded under article 2(2) (a),(b), and (c), the contract's 
estimated value may not be less than ECU 400,000.55 For contracts 
providing telecommunications networks or services, however, the 
estimated value must be at least ECU 600,000.56 Third, public works 
contracts must be estimated at ECU five million or higher.57 
B. The Nuts and Bolts of the Utilities Directive 
Contracting authorities in most circumstances must make a "call 
for competition"58 by placing a notice in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities. 59 Three forms of notice are permitted. The 
buyer may use either a traditional notice advertising the particular 
procurement at hand,60 a "periodic indicative notice" which esti-
mates the authority'S procurement intentions,61 or a "notice on the 
existence of a qualification system. "62 Any contracting authority that 
proposes to conduct article 2(2) activities must place a periodic 
indicative notice in the Official Journal at least once a year to publi-
cize prospective supplies and works contracts estimated to exceed 
the threshold values.63 
Contracting authorities ultimately decide which award procedure 
will be appropriate for the various projects. There are three basic 
tendering procedures which contracting authorities may choose be-
tween freely: open, negotiated, or restricted. 64 Open procedures 
must allow all interested suppliers or contractors to submit tenders.65 
Restricted procedures only apply to those candidates who are invited 
by the contracting authority.66 In negotiated procedures, the con-
tracting authority consults specifically chosen suppliers or contrac-
tors to negotiate the terms of the contract. 67 The most economically 
advantageous tender or the lowest price bid is the standard to guide 
55/d. art. 12(1)(a). 
56 Council Directive 90/531, supra note 33, art. 12(1) (b). 
57Id. art. 12(1)(c). 
58Id. art. 15(1). 
59Id. arts. 16(4), 19(2). 
60 Council Directive 90/531, supra note 33, art. 16(1) (a). 
61Id. arts. 16(1)(b), 16(2). 
62Id. arts. 16(1)(c), 16(3). 
63Id. arts. 17(1)(a), 17(l)(b)(2). 
64 Council Directive 90/531, supra note 33, art. 1 (6). 
65Id. art. 1 (6)(a). 
66Id. art. 1 (6)(b). 
67Id. art. 1 (6)(c). 
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contracting authorities' final decisions regardless of the tendering 
procedure chosen.68 
C. Article 29-The Focus of International Attention 
In order to ensure equal access to third-country markets for EC 
suppliers and contractors, the Directive allows EC preferencing in 
certain circumstances. Article 29 proves to be the Community's 
bargaining chip in international negotiations.69 This article applies 
to tenders involving "products originating in third countries with 
which the Community has not achieved multilaterally or bilaterally, 
an agreement ensuring comparable and effective access for Com-
munity undertakings in the markets of those third countries. "70 Ac-
cording to article 29, any supplies procurement may be rejected if 
the proportion of products originating outside the European Com-
munity exceeds 50 percent of the value of the products associated 
with the bid. 71 Furthermore, when tenders are equivalent, prefer-
ences shall be given to the EC bid.72 Equivalent bids are defined by 
this provision if the price difference does not exceed 3 percent.73 
Article 29 has been the root of great debate and hostility between 
the United States and the EC during the past year.74 The EC Com-
mission continuously emphasized its willingness to negotiate either 
bilaterally or multilaterally for the elimination of this controversial 
reciprocity clause in article 29.75 Mter a year of hostility, the United 
States and the EC at least partially resolved the dispute over access 
to transatlantic public procurement contracts during a meeting in 
68 ld. art. 27. 
69 EC Criticizes U.S. Procurement Practices in Response to U.S. Retaliation Threat, Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA), May 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ECLaw File [hereinafter EC 
Criticizes U. S. Procurement Practices J. 
70 Council Directive 90/531, supra note 33, art. 29(1). 
71 ld. art. 29 (2). 
721d. art. 29 (3). 
731d. 
74 EC Criticizes U.S. Procurement Practices, supra note 69. 
751d. The United States responded to article 29 by threatening trade sanctions. In response 
to U.S. retaliatory threats, the Commission stated: "[Ilt is hard to understand why the country 
which operates the Buy American Act, whose sole aim is to discriminate systematically in 
government purchases, should consider that it has any grounds whatever for complaining of 
discrimination by others in the field of public procurement." ld. Under the Buy American 
Act, the purchasing authority must choose the U.S. bid if it costs as much as 25 percent more 
than the non-U.S. bid. ld. Thus, the EC asserts that if the U.S. administration wants progress 
toward opening public procurement markets, it should match its behavior to its rhetoric and 
dispense with discriminatory measures on public contracts. ld. 
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May 1993.76 Specifically, the agreement between the United States 
and the EC only eliminates discrimination against U.S.-based com-
panies allowed under article 29 involving public contracts for heavy 
electrical equipment.77 Until a similar agreement is achieved in the 
remaining sectors, namely telecommunications, energy, and trans-
port, EC Member States may continue to discriminate against the 
United States in these sectors pursuant to the terms of article 29.78 
The United States reacted to EC discrimination in the telecom-
munications sector by imposing trade sanctions.79 The United States, 
however, excluded Germany from U.S. sanctions because Germany 
never adopted article 29 discriminatory practices against U.S. com-
panies.80 The United States and Germany entered into a bilateral 
agreement allowing mutual access to each other's public tenders.81 
According to the European Community Commission, this is a 
breach of Community trade law.82 As a result, in order to preserve 
its international credibility, the EC Commission may be forced to 
take legal action against Germany by bringing charges before the 
European Court of Justice.83 In addition, the EC perceives Ger-
many's actions as a challenge and a threat to the Commission's 
credibility and responsibility for international trade negotiations 
and agreements because it proves that the Commission is not the 
76 EC Ministers Approve Pa:rtial Solution with U.S. in Public Procurement Dispute, Daily Rep. 
for Executives (BNA) , May 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. Declaring 
article 29 discriminatory and a violation of GATT, the United States demanded that the EC 
waive article 29 or risk retaliation. Id. The agreement ultimately reached between the United 
States and the EC represents the result of months of negotiations between EC Trade Com-
missioner, Leon Brittan and U.S. Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor. Id. 
77 EC Responds to U.S. Sanctions on Procurement, PR Newswire, May 27, 1993, available in 
LEXlS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. Thirty-three states have agreed to consider removing "Buy 
American" restrictions, but no firm commitments have been made. Id. Similarly, the U.S. 
administration must request that the remaining 17 states also consider such action. Id. The 
U.S. administration is also seeking promises from the largest U.S. municipalities to do the 
same. Id. The ultimate result may be the elimination of "Buy American," a principal that has 
pervaded the United States for over 60 years. Id. 
78Id. 
79 Germany Under Attack for Deserting EC in Dispute With Washington, AGENCE PRESSE 
FRANCE, June 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. Specifically, U.S. 
telecommunication companies shut out EC firms from U.S. federal tenders worth approxi-
mately 20 million dollars in lost business. Id. The European Community in turn, retaliated 
with similar trade sanctions against U.S. companies worth 15 million dollars. Id. 
80Id. 
8! Trade Policy: LessonsFrom U.S.-German Deal, Bus. EUR.,June 21,1993, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter Lessons From U.S.-German Deal]. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
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sole source with which a third party must negotiate.84 Moreover, 
Germany's agreement with the United States completely ignores its 
obligations as a Member State to comply with policy decisions en-
acted by the Council of Ministers, such as the imposition of counter-
sanctions against the United States in the public procurement dis-
pute.85 
III. THE REMEDIES DIRECTIVE 
Recognizing that Council Directive 90/531 establishes rules for 
procurement procedures, but does not contain any specific provi-
sions ensuring effective application for interested bidders, the Coun-
cil adopted Directive 92/13,86 the Remedies Directive, in February 
1992.87 The Remedies Directive ensures appropriate review proce-
dures for suppliers or contractors who are the victims of a violation 
of EC law or national rules implementing EC law with regard to 
public procurement in the four sectors.88 The EC learned from its 
experience with the ineffective implementation of the Supplies and 
Works Directives that inadequate remedies distort and negatively 
affect the entire tendering process.89 Thus, Member States must 
provide a meaningful enforcement regime to ensure that the trans-
parency and non-discrimination guarantees of the Utilities Directive 
are upheld.90 Moreover, because the Remedies Directive comple-
men ts and enhances the effectiveness of the Utilities Directive, both 
Directives must be implemented simultaneously.91 
The Remedies Directive requires Member States to follow proce-
dures necessary to ensure that effectively contracting authorities' 
decisions are reviewable upon request.92 Under the Remedies Direc-
tive, Member States must make review procedures available to all 
persons with an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who 
have been or risk being affected negatively by an alleged infringe-
ment.93 The authorities responsible for the review procedures are 
84 See EC Pressing Challenge of Germany Over Separate Trade Deal With U.S., Daily Rep. for 
Executives (BNA),june 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter 
EC Pressing Challenge of Germany]. 
85Id. 
86 Council Directive 92/13,1992 OJ. (L 76) 14. 
87Id. 
86 See id. 
89Id. 
90Id. 
91 Council Directive 92/13, supra note 86, art. 15. 
92Id. art. 1 (1). 
93Id. art. 1 (3). 
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not judicial in nature.94 Therefore, written reasons must always ac-
company decisions.95 In addition, Member States must ensure that 
a court, independent of both the contracting party and the review 
board, is available to review the initial decision.96 Member States also 
must ensure that decisions by the review bodies can be enforced 
successfully with a legally binding effect. 97 
The Member States must empower reviewing bodies to correct an 
alleged infringement or prevent further injury.98 Member States may 
establish their own specific authority for reviewing tendering proce-
dures.99 Review bodies may be empowered to take the necessary 
action to either correct the alleged violation or prevent further 
injury to the interested party. In addition, review bodies may set 
aside decisions made unlawfully. In cases where an infringement has 
been identified already, review bodies may order violators to pay a 
fine.lOo In all cases, and regardless of which power the review board 
exercises, damages must be awarded to persons injured by infringe-
ments. lOl 
The Remedies Directive provides an alternative to the remedial 
powers granted the review boards, as well as an added check on the 
application of the Utilities Directive.102 This Directive establishes an 
"attestation" system which allows contracting authorities to subject 
their contracting procedures to periodic audits by outside inde-
pendent auditors. 103 The "attestation" system is designed to ensure 
that public sector contracting authorities and private sector contract-
ing authorities receive equal benefits.104 
Upon a determination that a "clear and manifest infringement" 
of EC law in the public procurement market occurred during a 
contract award, the Commission may invoke corrective proce-
dures. lo5 The purpose of the "corrective mechanism" is to grant the 
Commission the power to intervene immediately at the national 
level before a contract award procedure is completed. 106 In order to 
94 [d. art. 2(9). 
95 [d. art 2(8). 
96 Council Directive 92/13, supra note 86, art. 2(9). 
97 [d. art 2(8). 
98 [d. art. '2. 
99 [d. 
J(XJ [d. art. 2(1)(c). 
101 Council Directive 92/13, supra note 86, art. 2(1) (d). 
102 [d. 
103 [d. arts. 3, 4, and 6. 
104 Weiss, supra note 8, at 333. 
105 Council Directive 92/13, supra note 86, art. 8(1). 
106 [d.; see also Weiss, supra note 8, at 334. 
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exercise its corrective powers, the Commission must notifY the Mem-
ber States and the contracting authority of the basis of the Commis-
sion's opinion that a Member State or contracting authority com-
mitted an infringement in the procurement procedures. 107 Within 
thirty days of receipt of the Commission's notice, Member States 
either must confirm that the contracting authority corrected the 
infringement, !Os explain why the contracting authority failed to 
make a correction,lOg or notifY the Commission that the contracting 
authority suspended the contract award procedure. no 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEWLY ADOPTED UTILITIES AND 
REMEDIES DIRECTIVES 
The Utilities Directive represents a realization within the EC that 
efforts must be made to open the procurement markets in the 
excluded sectors. Additionally, the Remedies Directive manifests an 
understanding that an open market will not succeed without defini-
tive enforcement guarantees. The success of this effort is difficult to 
predict because much depends on how the Member States will 
choose to implement the Council's Directive. If past experience in 
this market is any indication, Member States may be able to exercise 
enough latitude and discretion when implementing the Directives 
into national law so that the desired impact will be lost. lll Without 
Member State compliance, however, a unified European market for 
procurement con tracts will never be formed. 112 
The Utilities Directive clearly defines the tendering procedures 
expected, and explicitly calls for publicized practices. These proce-
dures include strict publication requirements, specific time limits 
between publication and the awarding of a bid, and publication of 
the name of the company ultimately awarded the contract. ll3 The 
publishing criteria provided in the Directive should force contract-
ing authorities to stop protectionist practices. Additionally, the 
107 Council Directive 92/13, supra note 86, art. 8(2). 
10sId. art. 8(3)(a). 
109 Id. art. 8(3)(b). 
110 Id. art. 8(3)(c). When the contracting authority suspends an award procedure, notice 
also must be given to the Commission when the suspension is lifted or a new procedure 
concerning the same issue is commenced. Id. art. 8(5). 
III See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
112 See Weiss, supra note 8, at 311. 
113 EC Panel Passes Measure to Ease Appeals Process for Public Contracts Disputes, Infl Trade 
Rep. (BNA), Feb. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ECLaw File. 
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Remedies Directive provides an added guarantee that nationalistic 
preferencing in the EC will end. By implementing the Remedies and 
Utilities Directives simultaneously, the strength of each Directive is 
enhanced greatly. 
The Remedies Directive requires Member States to establish ef-
fective appeals procedures for each phase of the public procure-
ment process so that challenges may be made as soon as unfair 
practices occur.n4 Problems may arise, however, when bidders try to 
prove an actual infringement. ll5 The applicant also must be able to 
identify the amount of loss caused by the alleged infringement. ll6 
The Remedies Directive fails to tie specific infringements to a set 
value of compensation. Thus, the ultimate burden of proof for 
damages rests upon the injured party.ll7 
While the Utilities and Remedies Directives demonstrate that the 
EC recognizes the need to promote a unified, open economy, Ger-
many's actions call the effectiveness of these Directives into ques-
tion. Germany's decision to ignore the Directive and cooperate with 
the United States proves that Member States may not be entirely 
ready to act as a unified force. At the very least, Germany's actions 
demonstrate that Member States still can find ways to work around 
the provisions of each Directive to benefit their own national inter-
ests. 
As the EC moves closer to attaining its goal of integration, Mem-
ber States must learn to stop putting their national interests first. ll8 
The actions of Germany, one of the most "pro-integrationist" coun-
tries, raise a doubt as to whether the EC is capable of achieving 
complete integration. 1l9 The episode with Germany clearly demon-
strates how failure to look beyond a short-term gain, and refusal to 
act for the common good rather than with an eye for national 
interests will disrupt Community progress and weaken the Commu-
nity's position as a player in the international market. 
Germany's decision to negotiate independently with the United 
States reflects a nationalistic choice to protect its own interests 
114 Id. 
115 Richard J. Astor, The Remedies Diredive: Introdudion and Selective Summary, INT'L Bus. 
L. 247, 249 (May 1991). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Lessons From U.S.-German Deal, supra note 81. 
119 Id.; see also EC Pressing Challenge of Germany, supra note 84. 
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already established in U.S. markets.120 Germany is not willing to risk 
losing its substantial niche in U.S. telecommunications markets.l2l 
Thus, Germany independently refused to abide by the terms of the 
Utilities Directive and deny U.S. firms preference in bids for govern-
ment telecommunications contracts.122 
The key to attaining integration is for the Member States to put 
the mutually shared single market interests before any self-serving 
national interests. 123 Without adopting such a policy, all Member 
States may follow the non-Community-minded example set by Ger-
many. The result may be the dissolution of the EC as a unified force 
as each Member State pursues its own national interests whenever 
such action is more advantageous.124 
CONCLUSION 
The EC has been working for over two decades on a strategy 
aimed at opening the Community's public procurement markets to 
cross-border competition. The Supplies and Works Directives proved 
to be ineffective because of the ability of Member States to manipu-
late the provisions and implement them as they desired. Thus, 
contract awards continued to go to the national champion. Having 
learned from the initial mistakes of the Works and Supplies Direc-
tives, the Council tightened the loopholes in the Utilities Directive. 
In addition, unlike the Works and Supplies Directive, the EC imple-
mented the Utilities Directive at the same time as the Remedies 
Directive. The underlying intent was to encourage contract authori-
ties to provide more transparency and less discrimination in their 
tendering procedures. For those authorities which fail to do so, 
effective remedies are available. Thus, the basic framework for ef-
fectively opening the public procurement market has been estab-
lished. 
Full compliance, however, depends on each Member State realiz-
ing that the long-term benefits of an open market far outweigh the 
short-term gains from protectionist practices. The episode with Ger-
many represents a setback in EC progress. In addition, it demon-
120 Bonn Seen Risking EC Telecom Row to Make U.S. Inroads, Reuter Eur. Community Rep., 
June 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. 
121 See id. 
122Id. 
123 See id. 
124 EC Pressing Challenge of Germany, supra note 84. 
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strates the number of potential weak links in the chain toward total 
integration. As a result, questions remain as to whether the Euro-
pean Community truly will be able to integrate and act as a unified 
force rather than individual threads of a patchwork quilt. Until all 
Member States prove to take integration seriously, liberalization of 
the public procurement market cannot be achieved effectively. 
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